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How	the	European	Union	falls	apart
The	European	Union	has	come	under	intense	pressure	from	the	Eurozone	crisis,	the	migration	crisis,
and	Brexit,	but	is	it	at	serious	risk	of	falling	apart?	And	if	so,	how	would	this	disintegration	take	place?
Drawing	on	his	latest	book,	Hans	Vollaard	explains	that	rather	than	experiencing	a	sudden	collapse,
the	EU	might	instead	suffer	a	slow	decline	driven	by	‘partial	exits’	from	aspects	of	European	integration.
The	best-case	scenario	may	be	one	in	which	the	EU	continues	to	limp	ahead	in	the	years	to	come,	but
with	many	members	rather	grudgingly	accepting	it	as	the	least	unattractive	option.
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How	far	in	advance	would	you	really	be	able	to	tell	that	the	European	Union	is	disintegrating	or	has	disintegrated?
And	which	factors	do	you	think	are	fundamental	to	explaining	the	present	and	future	course	of	European
(dis)integration?	These	are	crucial	questions	for	any	political	observer	of	EU	politics,	whether	they	work	as	a	risk
manager,	a	journalist,	a	policy	strategist,	or	a	political	scientist.	These	questions	have	become	particularly	relevant
since	the	outbreak	of	the	debt	crises	in	the	Eurozone	and	the	Brexit	referendum.
Confusion	and	contradictions	are	rife	in	perspectives	on	the	evolution	of	the	European	Union,	ranging	from	those
prophesising	full-scale	federalisation,	to	those	predicting	complete	collapse.	Theories	can	help	to	sensitise	us	to
structural	dynamics,	as	well	as	crucial	factors	and	actors	in	large-scale	processes	like	European	disintegration.
Unfortunately,	there	has	not	yet	been	much	theorising	on	the	subject	of	European	disintegration.	My	new	book
European	disintegration:	A	search	for	explanations	provides	an	overview	of	how	European	disintegration	can	be
conceptualised	and	explained	and	seeks	the	most	fruitful	explanation.	It	examines	theories	of	European	integration
and	comparative	analyses	of	the	rise	and	fall	of	federations,	empires,	and	states.
The	work	by	Stein	Rokkan,	Albert	Hirschman	and	Stefano	Bartolini	offers	the	most	promising	theoretical	foundation
to	conceptualise	and	explain	European	disintegration.	European	disintegration	concerns	both	the	system	as	a	whole,
the	EU,	and	individual	actors,	such	as	member	states	but	also	individuals,	companies,	or	investment	funds.	At	the
actor-level,	European	disintegration	relates	to	the	withdrawal	from	the	EU’s	allocation	of	values.	An	actor	can
withdraw	from	the	EU	entirely,	for	instance,	companies	moving	outside	the	EU	or	a	member	state	seeking	full	exit	as
the	UK	tries	to	do	now.	Actors	can	also	partially	withdraw	from	the	EU,	by	complying	less	with	EU	law,	reclaiming
core	competences	from	the	EU,	or	reducing	budget	contributions	to	the	EU.	Whether	these	partial	or	full	exits	will	be
used,	depends	on	the	mechanism	of	exit,	voice	and	loyalty	for	which	dissatisfaction	is	the	starting	point.
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Dissatisfaction	is	widespread	in	the	EU.	Many	governments,	parties,	and	voters	have	pragmatic	concerns	about	the
extent	to	which	the	EU	serves	national	interests.	Additionally,	left-wing	Eurosceptics	oppose	the	EU’s	market
liberalisation	and	austerity	policies	on	principle,	whereas	their	right-wing	counterparts	resist	the	encroachment	upon
national	sovereignty	and	identity	by	migration	and	European	power-sharing.	However,	dissatisfaction	is	a	normal
condition	in	any	political	formation.	The	key	question	is	how	dissatisfaction	is	processed	within	the	EU.
Regardless	of	the	nature	or	degree	of	dissatisfaction	within	the	EU,	the	EU’s	very	structure	is	rather	inhibitive	to
voicing	Eurosceptic	dissatisfaction	with	proper	effect.	Market	and	sovereignty-sharing	principles	of	the	EU	are
enshrined	in	treaties	and	enforced	by	unelected	bodies,	such	as	the	European	Central	Bank	and	the	Court	of	Justice
of	the	European	Union.	It	is	also	difficult	for	the	collectives	of	the	Council	and	the	European	Parliament	to	be
responsive	to	dissatisfied	voices	in	light	of	divergent	preferences	across	and	within	member	states	and	between	and
within	the	elites	and	the	masses.	In	particular,	measures	to	assuage	dissatisfaction	among	those	who	fear	economic
competition	and	budget	cuts	in	the	framework	of	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	can	increase	politico-cultural
dissatisfaction	about	migration	and	power-sharing	in	the	EU	and	vice	versa.
Without	effective	voice	options,	withdrawal	might	be	more	likely.	EU	loyalty	is	also	rather	limited	in	comparison	to
national	loyalty,	for	which	exits	from	the	EU	are	even	less	restrained.	Yet,	a	full	exit	of	a	member	state	is	rather
unlikely.	As	most	governments,	parties,	and	voters	think	that	national	states	cannot	do	better	than	the	EU	or	that
other	international	organisations	such	as	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	(EEU)	cannot	offer	states	a	better	deal,	they
prefer	to	remain	in	the	EU.	Even	in	Greece	during	the	heat	of	the	debt	crisis,	a	majority	perceived	life	outside	the	EU
as	being	worse	than	inside.	Only	in	the	UK	did	a	majority	perceive	the	costs	of	EU	membership	(such	as	migration)
as	being	higher	than	the	benefits	of	leaving.
The	lack	of	viable	national	or	international	alternatives	to	the	EU	has	been	the	key	explanation	for	why	the
mechanism	of	exit,	voice	and	loyalty	never	led	to	steps	towards	a	full	exit	of	a	member	state	until	now,	with	the	UK	as
the	exception.	Therefore,	a	complete	breakdown	of	the	EU	soon	appears	to	be	highly	unlikely.	On	first	sight,	the	EU
would	therefore	have	time	to	recuperate.	However,	remaining	dissatisfaction	is	expressed	by	attempts	to	pursue
partial	exits	from	the	EU’s	allocation	of	values,	such	as	electoral	apathy,	deteriorating	compliance	with	EU	law,	pleas
against	risk-sharing	in	the	monetary	union,	calls	for	lower	EU	budget	contributions,	and	demands	to	renationalise
competences.
These	partial	exits	undermine	the	EU,	as	they	constrain	the	effective	and	legitimate	enforcement	of	its	rule	(in	other
words,	prevent	partial	exits),	to	strengthen	the	benefits	for	its	member	states,	business,	and	citizens	(to	reduce
dissatisfaction),	to	enhance	its	internal	infrastructure	to	effectively	address	dissatisfaction,	and	to	cultivate	loyalty	to
the	EU.	This	relates	to	the	second	understanding	of	system-level	disintegration	concerning	the	EU’s	capacity	to	lock-
in	resources	and	actors.	The	weaker	the	EU’s	boundary	control,	the	weaker	EU	loyalty,	the	less	effective	its
infrastructure	to	express	dissatisfaction	effectively,	the	lower	the	costs	to	leave	and	the	higher	the	costs	of	voice.
When	member	states,	business,	voters	and	other	actors	are	subsequently	less	enticed	to	exchange	resources	in	the
EU,	the	EU	will	lose	even	more	means	to	strengthen	itself	and	its	attractiveness.	Partial	exits	thus	sap	the	EU	slowly
from	within.	Rather	than	experiencing	a	sudden	collapse,	the	EU	would	thus	instead	sink	slowly	into	oblivion.
Perhaps	as	a	message	of	comfort	for	those	who	want	to	maintain	the	EU,	many	if	not	all	states,	empires,	regional
organisations,	currency	areas,	and	federations	have	previously	struggled	with	similar	problems.	It	is	no	surprise	that
many	political	formations	have	disintegrated	or	still	face	disintegrative	challenges	(just	think	of	Spain,	Canada,
Belgium,	and	the	UK).	The	EU	still	obtains	necessary	resources	to	strengthen	its	locking-in	capacity	and
attractiveness	from	member	states	such	as	Germany,	which	are	relatively	satisfied	about	the	EU,	more	loyal	to	the
EU,	and	perceiving	the	EU	still	as	the	best	(or	least	bad)	alternative	to	attain	security,	prosperity,	or	environmental
sustainability.	This	will	allow	the	EU	to	limp	ahead	for	the	years	to	come,	but	with	many	members	rather	grudgingly
accepting	it	as	the	least	unattractive	option.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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